Tax Situs of River Boats in a Non-Domiciliary State--Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel and Transportation Co. by Neal, Sidney A.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 39 | Issue 4 Article 15
1951
Tax Situs of River Boats in a Non-Domiciliary
State--Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel and
Transportation Co.
Sidney A. Neal
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neal, Sidney A. (1951) "Tax Situs of River Boats in a Non-Domiciliary State--Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel and Transportation Co.,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 39 : Iss. 4 , Article 15.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol39/iss4/15
KENTucKy LAw JouPNAL
of the child and has imputed the negligence of one parent to the other, probably
because, under the wrongful death statute, both parents will benefit. How does
the court logically distinguish the Hale case from these parent-child cases upon
the custody question? The court does not try to make distinction, and there
seems to be no logical one. It merely says that those cases are clearly distin-
gmshable from this case.
It is submitted that in the Hale case the Court of Appeals seems to re-
pudiate the custody-agency concept of the parent-child cases by refusing to
utilize agency principles for imputing the negligence of the careless father to
the plaintiff mother, the court permits the mother to recover the amount to
which she is entitled, while at the same time the father can recover nothing.
This case points the way to a reversal of the Kentucky doctrine which m
the parent-child-custody situation has been used to bar recovery under our
statute.2' A majority of jurisdictions have applied a less harsh rule in those
cases barrng recovery only to the extent that it will inure to the benefit of the
negligent parent-beneficiary.'
CECIL D. WALDEN
TAX SITUS OF RIVER BOATS IN A NON-DOMICILIARY STATE -
REEVES V ISLAND CREEK FUEL AND TRANSPORTATION CO.
A case recently decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals seems to im-
port an extension of the principles now used to determine the tax situs of
river boats and barges in a non-domiciliary state. In Reeves v. Island Creek
Fuel and Transportation Co.,' the Commonwealth of Kentucky instituted omitted
tax assessment proceedings in the courts of certain counties bordering the Oluo
River to assess and collect from the appellee ad valorem property taxes on niver
boats and barges. Appellee obtained a permanent injunction enjoimng further
prosecution, and this appeal was taken. The Island Creek Co., a Maine cor-
poration, was almost exclusively engaged in shipping coal by barge on the Ohio
River between Huntington, West Virgima, and Cincinnati, Ohio, on behalf of
its parent company. Although the domiciliary state was Maine, the boats and
barges had never been there, nor was there any prospect of their being there m
the future. The company had operated its two tugs and fifty-four barges over
this route, which is 94.6% in Kentucky,- during the years m question with rela-
Unless this is true the Kentucky court finds itself faced with a curious
anomaly. Where a father kills is child, recovery is allowed. Where a third party
kills the child and the father is negligent a recovery is demed. It is possible that
considerations of "policy" lead the Court of Appeals to such a result. If a suit is
brought against a parent for a negligent injury, an insurance company mdemnitor
is no doubt always in the background, and the burden of payment of the judgment
is spread. This might not be true where the defendant is a third party.
See Note, 2 A. L. R. 2d 785, at 799.
313 Ky. 400, 230 S.W 2d 924 (1950).
This case seems to be decided in terms of route mileage. However, the ac-
tual mileage traveled in Kentucky bore the same proportionate relationslp to the
total mileage traveled as that part of the route in Kentucky bore to the full route.
See brief on behalf of Campbell County, Kentucky, as anncus curiae, page 39.
Had this not been reasonably true the result might have been unfair, or might well
have been different.
NOTES ON RECENT CASES
tively a few interruotions throughout each year. The court held that 94.6% of
the value of the property in question was taxable in Kentucky and that each
county and school district was entitled to its proportionate share of that part
on a mileage basis.
The right of a state to tax river boats on an apportionate basis was recog-
nized for the first time in Ott v. Missisnppi Valley Barge Line Company.3 Prior
to that case it had been argued that boats were taxable only in their state of
domicile' unless they had acquired situs elsewhere by remaining within the tax-
ing junsdiction throughout the entire tax year." In the Ott case, however, an
analogy was drawn between the barge lines concerned and railroads, and Louis-
iana was allowed to tax the property on the same basis. The basis in the railroad
cases which indicates the proportionate amount of the property in regard to the
whole that the state may tax may be either the number of miles operated in the
state in relation to the number of miles operated by the company,' or the average
number of cars in the state during the year if there is no regular schedule or run.
The Island Creek Fuel case applies certain general rules concerning the tax
situs of personal property. As a practical matter they are drawn from the railroad
cases, but there is no attempt to make an analogy. The problem is treated as a
new one, and in so doing Kentucky appears to have injected a variation on a con-
cept well established in the, railroad cases. From the apportionment cases has
evolved a specialized interpretation of the permanency required to give personal
property tax situs since no specific railroad car is likely to remain in the state
throughout the tax year. The fact that a certain portion of the property as a
whole is withnn the state throughout the tax year is said to be sufficient even
though no particular unit stays witlun the state for the entire period;' but per-
manency thereby modified remained essential to the establishment of tax situs.
It was argued in both the Island Creek Fuel case and the Ott case that the visits
of the boats were irregular, sporadic, and for fractional periods of the year only,
and therefore, lacking in the permanency necessary to establish tax situs. No doubt
this was intended to point out that at certain times there were no units witlun
Louisiana, for as was indicated previously no one unit need remain witlun the
state so long as there is continuous protection afforded a portion of interchange-
able units. The issue was not decided in the Ott case, however, because Louisiana
acknowledged that the tax was onlv on the boats and barges permanently within
the state "and by permanently is meant throughout the taxing year."' Up to this
point the most pertinent dicta seemed to indicate that the concept of "continous
protection" required at least some units to remain within the state at all times
during the tax year2' In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota the court said by way
of dictum, in a decision allowing the domiciliary state to tax all the planes of a
336 U.S. 169 (1949).
St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U.S. 1870); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Kentucky, 222 U.S. 68 (1911).
'Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
'Pullmans Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149 (1900); American
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
'Pullmans Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); American
Refngerator'Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899); Commonwealth v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 214 Ky. 339, 283 S.W 119 (1926).
'Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 175 (1949).
"Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Minnesota, 822 U.S. 292 (1944).
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regularly scheduled airline operating out of it, "But the doctrine of apportionment
has neither in theory nor in practice been applied to tax units of interstate com-
merce visiting [the non-domiciliary state] for fractional periods of the taxing
year."" It is not the bare statement, but the facts to wich it refers, that makes
it significant in the light of the present problem.
In the Island Creek Fuel case the Kentucky court was forced to decide
whether this permanency could be interpreted in a more liberal sense. The Ken-
tucky Court first pointed out that permanency meant use and employment in a
state with consistent continuity. Then starting with the parent company and
working down to the operations of the appellee s boats and barges the court said:
"We, therefore, do not limit our view to the accidents of
appearance but look at all the facts which have inherent or relative
significance. But correlating and coordinating these facts, we find a
consistent, ordered and coherent whole. The fact then remains that
the tugs and barges, an indispensable part of the whole as designed
by appellee or its parent company in the operation of its business,
are as necessarily present in Kentucky as the loading and unloading
facilities have their situs in Ohio and West Virgima, respectively. This
continuity and consistency of presence in Kentucky attaches such
permanency as to take it out of the zones of mere transiency or a
sporadic and temporary presence. The parts of this whole receive
the protection of this state. We conclude that they have acquired
a tax situs here."'2
The fact that these boats and barges were at no time in the domiciliary state
leaves undetermined the right of the non-domiciliary state to tax when part of
the barge run is in the domiciliary state. The power of the domiciliary
state to tax all units when the visits by them out of the state are for
fractional periods of the year only has been upheld, whether such visits were
regularly scheduled or not.i The taxing power of the states visited by units which
have already been taxed by the domiciliary state has apparently never been di-
rectly ruled on by the courts, nor does the present case control its solution."
The handling of the problem presented in the Island Creek Fuel case does
not strike one as being unjust or unreasonable. It is likely that an average barge
line regularly and necessarily passing through a state in the course of its business
will not have barges in the state at all times throughout the year; it is likely that
a railroad regularly passing through a state in the course of its business will have
some cars in the state at all times. Yet the reason for taxing the railroad applies
with equal force to the regularly operating barge line. Each should bear its
fair share of the tax burden; the property of each receives the protection of the
state throughout the year. ' The fact that the barge line may not have boats in
n Id. at 297.
'2Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel and Transportation Co., 313 Ky. 400, 406,
230 S.W 2d 924, - (1950).
" New York Central Railroad v. Miller 202 U.S. 584 (1906); Northwest Air-
lines Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
" Although there would be permanency of the sort found in the Island Creek
Fuel case, the problem of double taxation would arise since the dormciliary state
could tax the entire value.
' Commonwealth v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 214 Ky. 339, "283 S.W
119 (1926).
NOTES ON RECENT CASES
the state continuously is a mere superficial difference under these circumstances."
The barge line in the Island Creek Fuel case travels a single route almost
exclusively and does so consistently, even though not on a rigid schedule. The
position of a barge line which is an independent contract carrier without taxable
units in the state at all times is, therefore, not necessarily determined.
In the railroad cases it was held not to matter that the company had no
offices, no regular schedule or runs in the state so long as the cars as a whole re-
ceived the protection of the state continuously throughout the tax year. The av-
erage number of cars used in the state during the year was found to be the proper
basis for determining the tax.'7 With the concepts of permanency and continuity
suggested in the Island Creek Fuel case it could be that barge lines following no
regular route but whose boats and barges consistently pass through the state in
the conduct of its business are in an analogous position and subject to a tax
apportioned on the basis of the average number of units. But to lift these con-
cepts without the accompanying facts might result in the distortion of a reason-
able fiction.
The Island Creek Fuel case does not hold that personal property can acquire
tax situs merely by temporary and irregular, though repeated, visits. But rather
it holds that visits which appear to be temporary and irregular when viewed
separately may be sufficiently necessary, repeated and certain to constitute per-
manency when viewed as a whole. The same could probably be found true of
an independent carrier under some circumstances. as where the line could operate
logically or profitably only in a certain trade or between certain points, or as
where a base of operations made it necessarv for the barges to travel in part of
the state on all trips. If this be granted. somewhere beyond a line must be drawn.
Just how far the court would have been willing to carry this fiction is not indi-
cated, but a reasonable application as such criteria as repeated, necessary and
certain would seem to be determining.
StoNEY A. NEAL
It might, however, allow the douciliary state to tax the entire value. Under
Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1900) the domiciliary state was
found to'have the power to tax property out of the state during the entire year
if it had not acquired tax situs elsewhere. If, therefore, the domiciliary state re-
fused to acknowledge the property s acquisition of out of state situs, it would
possibly retain its power to tax the property.
'T Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149 (1900); American
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
